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Abstract: The article proposes a policy framework for analysing corporate 
governance toward sustainable development. The aim is to set up a framework for 
analysing market evolution toward sustainability. In the first section, the paper 
briefly refers to recent theories about both market and government failures that 
express scepticism about the way framework conditions for market actors are set. 
For this reason, multi-layered governance structures seem advantageous if new 
solutions are to be developed in policy areas concerned with long-term change 
and stepwise internalisation of externalities. The paper introduces the principle of 
regulated self-regulation. With regard to corporate actors’ interests, it presents 
recent insights from theories about the knowledge-based firm, where the creation 
of new knowledge is based on the absorption of societal views. The result is 
greater  scope for the endogenous internalisation of externalities, which leads to a 
variety of new and different corporate strategies. Because governance has to set 
incentives for quite a diverse set of actors in their daily operations, the paper 
finally discusses innovation-inducing regulation. In both areas, regulated self-
regulation and innovation-inducing regulation, corporate and political governance 
co-evolve. The paper concludes that these co-evolutionary mechanisms may 
assume some of the stabilising and orientating functions previously exercised by 
framing activities of the state. In such a view, the governments’ main function is 
to facilitate learning processes, thus departing from the states’ function as known 
from welfare economics. 
 
Keywords: innovation-inducing regulation, knowledge creation, knowledge-
based firm, market and government failures, regulated self-regulation 
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1. Introduction 
This paper starts from the assumption that governance toward sustainable devel-
opment differs from conventional approaches of welfare economics (Hinterberger 
et al. 2000). Governance of sustainable development goes well beyond traditional, 
state-centred policy-making because it aims at pro-active changes of private ac-
tors’ behaviours at different levels. It necessarily involves the lower levels of pol-
icy-making and private individuals active in policy formulation and implementa-
tion. Innovations generate positive externalities, enabling corporate actors to play 
a public role while doing good business on competitive markets. The notion of co-
evolution put forward in this paper not only accepts the pursuit of profit in emerg-
ing markets for sustainability, it identifies this pursuit as a driving force toward 
policy integration and the internalisation of some externalities. Motivated by self-
interest and soft incentives, corporate actors transform areas previously perceived 
as part of the public domain into markets for sustainable development. The state, 
however, retains the responsibility for structural conditions and innovation-
inducing regulations. 
 
To test this assumption the article discusses the following questions: 
 
• What exactly is the function of governance systems for sustainable devel-
opment?  
• How do systems of political and corporate governance differ and how do 
they interact? 
• What are the characteristics of a system for developing synergies between 
political and corporate governance? 
• Assuming that corporate players can play a public role, which conclusions 
can be drawn for policy makers? How does that affect the conception of 
the role of the state? 
 
Methodologically, this paper refers to recent theories from both political science 
and economics. Political science analyses governance systems with less govern-
ment (Héritier 2002; Majone 1998; Young 1999); economics offers findings on 
firms, market failures and regulatory theories (Williamson 1999; Nelson 2002; 
Stiglitz 2000). The interdisciplinary approach is worthwhile because political sci-
ence, in particular what is known as actor-centred institutionalism, has a strong 
bond on administrations and policy-making. In analysing markets and firms, eco-
nomics proves helpful, in particular the emerging branches of New Institutional 
Economics1 and Evolutionary Economics. The analytical framework derived from 
these theories to an extent departs from models of rational choice, i.e. it does not 
assume a fully rational actor with perfect information (Ostrom 1998; Mantzavinos 
2002). Recent literature on corporate governance is of special relevance here as it 
provides insights into the motivation and self-interest of firms, which in turn is 
helpful for the design and reform of policies. 
 
                                                
1  One reviewer sees new institutional economics much in line with the neoclassical approach. I 
will argue in the paper that more recent approaches reveal a shift, in particular regarding 
rationality and firms. 
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Chapter 2 will give a short survey of theories about both market and government 
failures. It is proposed that both types of failure can be compensated by co-
evolution, i.e. by private actors assuming a public role and by governments 
providing appropriate incentives. Chapter 3 outlines some principles of govern-
ance as regulated self-regulation. Because co-evolution certainly goes beyond 
setting the frame, chapters 4, 5 and 6 show in more detail how corporate actors, 
markets, and innovation-inducing regulatory tools emerge. 
 
The present article fits well into a broader scope of ongoing policy research activi-
ties. The obvious reference is to the Johannesburg Summit 2002, which clearly 
addressed the need for public-private partnerships toward sustainability (Type II 
commitments). In analyzing a co-evolution between private and public rule-
making bodies, the ideas laid down here may especially fit for those regions 
where transnational and supra-international Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) emerges and where reliable governments as well as organized civil socie-
ties’ groups still have to come up. Our analytical framework seeks to provide a 
toolbox for evaluating these policies. 
2. Recent Theories on Market Failures and Government Failures - 
A Short Survey 
Markets are well known for being dynamic and powerful, but imperfect. Our short 
survey summarizes recent research results for categories of market failures that 
have been analysed extensively (e.g. Stiglitz 2000). To what extent do a) endoge-
nous learning efforts allow to overcome failures and b) exogenous incentives ena-
ble compensation? 
 
Market provision of public goods is difficult because their attributes of non-
rivalry in use and non-excludability make production unattractive. This standard 
conceptualisation of public goods can however be problematic (Nelson 2002). 
Attributes may change due to technological progress; harbours and lighthouses 
illustrate such a conversion from a public to a private good due to technological 
improvements and better pricing possibilities. Though citizens are usually taken 
as one aggregated unit, they benefit from public goods in innumerable different 
ways. Preferences are often heterogeneous and change over time. The assumption 
of a fixed borderline between private and public goods no longer seems tenable; 
in fact, the borderline is rather blurry. 
 
The notion of externalities also raises some questions. Internalisation efforts along 
Coase-type negotiations may come at the expense of third parties that have not 
been involved. Governments have to serve their respective voters and may tend 
toward making decisions in favour of certain vested interest groups. This might 
lead them to overlook vulnerable, little organized groups inside and outside socie-
ty. Participation, which also has merits in other areas of sustainability, certainly 
becomes a topic in internalisation strategies. Its relevance becomes even clearer 
when we look at the openness of technological change (Freeman 1998; Leonard-
Barton 1995), where mechanisms for absorbing new knowledge are crucial. Ac-
knowledging that firms pursue these interests of transforming knowledge into 
business concepts creates scope for an endogenous internalisation of externalities 
(Beckenbach 1998).  
 
The category of adaptation deficits refers to the speed at which markets and firms 
adapt to new circumstances arising from new legislation and other exogenous 
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factors. Evolutionary economics has shown that markets evolve step by step (Witt 
2003; Pelikan/Wegner 2003), created by pioneers and early imitators from a varie-
ty of firms. Consumers are relevant in this process because their specific demands 
often starts vague and need to co-evolve with market development. The point here 
is that a typical market process evolves over time, driven by changing corporate 
behaviour as well as by stakeholder activities. Seen from this angle, incremental 
corporate change and stakeholder involvement become driving forces that are at 
least as important as the Schumpeterian entrepreneur.  
 
Information deficits have also been the subject of extensive research in econom-
ics. What seems important for the present context is the necessary involvement of 
individuals and organisations in problem-solving efforts to balance information 
deficits. Though open or easy access to information may lower the costs of learn-
ing processes, the mere providing of information cannot replace real learning ef-
forts. Knowledge creation depends not only on information supply, but also–
essentially-on individual and organisational learning. 
 
Looking at market failures in general, the conclusion for governance structures is 
that to function properly, markets need participation and learning among and be-
yond market actors. If their efficiency is to be maintained and improved, markets 
need guidance and rules for stimulating participation and learning. Such guidance 
and rules can be provided by appropriate governance structures. The findings of 
Nobel laureates such as Douglass C. North (1990), Mancur Olson (1998), and 
Joseph Stiglitz (1998) would support this conclusion, which also fits in with the 
theories of New Institutional Economics and the German Ordnungspolitik. Be-
yond general statements, however, it seems that the real challenge is to stimulate 
continuous participation and learning processes rather than undertake heroic ef-
forts and set an everlasting frame. After all, co-evolution of different actors and 
different rules may lead to better development processes than the traditional divi-
sion of labour, where governments were supposed to determine the structural con-
ditions and businesses to comply.  
 
Recent theories on government failures have yielded similar findings. Beyond the 
often too simplistic general view of public choice theories, it makes sense to as-
sume that self-interest is an important motivating factor for politicians and bu-
reaucracies (Buchanan/Musgrave 1999). Moreover, regulatory agencies are ex-
posed to the lobbying of powerful actors, which leads to the ‘capture of the regu-
lator’ phenomenon. Clearly, control is the best check to self-interest and capturing 
endeavours. Such control may come from parliaments, competing parties, media, 
agencies for budget control, and civil society groups. Too much control, however, 
increases the regulatory costs and can seriously hamper innovations and learning.  
 
Government failures put the development of both markets and society at risk by 
 
• slowing down the dynamics of progress, 
• causing high regulatory costs (‘deadweight losses’), 
• creating incentives for rent-seeking and lobbying activities that favour es-
tablished interest groups against new businesses and SMEs, 
• crowding out voluntary action and other non-paid civil activities; people 
rely on the government to take action and flinch from voluntary action 
even if public programmes turn out to be ineffective, 
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• causing new externalities created by unforeseeable market responses to 
any regulation, 
• causing cognitive overload due to dense regulation. 
 
Ubiquitous knowledge deficits suggest a departure from rational choice approach-
es. No matter how extensive the competences pooled in their various administra-
tive organizations, governments hardly possess the knowledge necessary to steer 
business and society in a certain direction. They can acquire new knowledge 
through hearings, studies, expert committees, and advisory councils. Nevertheless, 
there is no occasion for any general optimism about governments’ steering capaci-
ties. Moreover, public budgets are loaded with huge deficits, so financial capaci-
ties are low. Governments depend heavily on the knowledge generated in the de-
centralized activities of research institutions, companies, and social bodies. Gov-
ernments’ comparative advantage in knowledge generation can rather be seen in 
terms of setting a tentative institutional frame, arriving at a consensus where con-
flicts among different groups arise, and formulating an overall orientation based 
on people’s heterogeneous views. Overcoming knowledge deficits by acknowl-
edging different roles and by accepting a division of labour in knowledge crea-
tion, thus, is a key to improving governments (Dror 2001; Stiglitz 1998; Rodrik 
2000; Pelikan/Wegner 2003; Young 1999). 
 
Our short survey on recent theorizing confirms that bad governments produce bad 
market outcomes, while good governments can improve market outcomes. Just as 
market failures are a stimulus to improving markets rather than giving up the 
whole idea of a market economy, government fallibility is no reason to give up 
regulatory policies. Two central government functions remain crucially important: 
governments guarantee certain structural conditions and counteract major market 
failures with severe negative impacts on society. Such endeavours are immensely 
complex. Market and government failures, therefore, call for a more comprehen-
sive governance structure that actively involves corporate and societal actors. 
Such an involvement is not only necessary in terms of making the voices of inter-
est groups and/or affected groups heard (which rational choice theorists suppose 
to be sufficient): It is fundamental in terms of knowledge creation. It is a perma-
nent search for both market and policy improvements (Dror 2001). Analytical 
comprehensiveness requires an endogenous business element, which is often ne-
glected in governance studies. 
 
Against this background, a helpful approach clearly is to analyse a comprehensive 
governance structure as a co-evolving system able to learn over time. Criteria 
could be whether the system helps to control both markets and governments and 
enables companies as well as citizens to participate in markets. In this regard, the 
law is an essential aid to citizens and SME’s in dealing with markets and govern-
ments (Nonet/Selznick 1978). The rule of law may serve, as we propose, an essen-
tial function for sustainable development, too. The following chapters will lay 
down further analytical steps in that direction. 
3. Governance as Regulated Self-Regulation 
Our notion of co-evolution starts from the proposition that markets and govern-
ments alike have a positive role to play in societies’ development, not a negative 
one. These positive roles can be seen where markets provide goods and foster new 
technologies, and where governments guarantee the conditions for a fruitful and 
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fulfilling life. Both functions are interrelated: markets rely on guidance and rules 
for which governments are indispensable; governments can only provide the con-
text of a fruitful life if markets serve their function, too. At the same time, both 
players rely on civil society, whose positive role is obvious (also cf. Ahrens 
2002). 
 
Regulated self-regulation refers to these positive roles. A market economy relies 
on a wide array of both market-based and political institutions that perform stabi-
lising, regulatory, and legitimising functions. Governance clearly takes place on 
multiple arenas, partly within and partly outside the scope of the state. It involves 
polycentric steering institutions (Héritier 2002; Young 1999) with a strong em-
phasis on subsidiarity, which has become prominent as a guiding principle of the 
EU’s Amsterdam Treaty. Governments need to ensure that markets work properly 
within such an institutional frame and at the lowest possible transaction cost level. 
Seen from this angle, the traditional dichotomy between market and state, or be-
tween laissez-faire and intervention, loses importance. Market and state serve 
complementary functions that keep the system running. A well-performing market 
economy is a mixed composition of state and markets. Langlois and Robertson 
(1995) on business institutions, North (1990), Pelikan/Wegner (2003), and Rodrik 
(2000) formulate similar views. 
 
According to Rodrik (2000), there are five basic types of market-supporting insti-
tutions that form a regulatory framework: property rights, macroeconomic stabili-
sation, social insurance, regulatory institutions, and conflict management.2 The 
latter refers to the necessity of arriving at a societal consensus when preferences 
change or unexpected events occur that demand a decision by society as a whole. 
It relates to the participatory capacities of a society. Concerned citizens participate 
e.g. through political referendums on individual issues (as in Switzerland), by 
being involved in public hearings (‘voice option’), by acting collectively as con-
sumers, by taking part in stakeholder consultations, by pooling financial power on 
the stock markets, and through their ability to control information provided by 
businesses. An econometric analysis across several countries by Rodrik (2000) 
reveals that participatory politics do enhance economic stability. It is worth under-
lining that such stability is defined in terms of resilience, i.e. the ability to adapt, 
and not in terms of sluggishness. 
 
Let us take the example of sustainability targets to illustrate the co-evolutionary 
governance approach: The standard approach of welfare economics assumes a 
perfectly informed government able to set proper targets for the provision of pub-
lic goods and for the internalisation of negative externalities. Such an approach is 
in evidence when Hinterberger et al (2000, p. 286) call for ‘ecological guardrails.’ 
Naïve market enthusiasts, in contrast, would claim that the forces of supply and 
demand do the job-targets would intervene in allocation efficiency and might not 
be needed at all. In distinction to both welfare economics and market enthusiasts, 
the governance approach this paper puts forward makes target formulation a co-
evolutionary process rather than a one-time shot. Targets are relevant because 
businesses need to widen their set of choices; they have to readjust their expecta-
tions in order to search for a new direction of innovations. People also need to 
reconsider their habits; they rely on communication in order to take other views 
into account. Targets, hence, need to be made consistent among different policy 
sectors in order to improve overall clarity. In this sense, we propose that an eco-
efficiency increase by a Factor Four can serve as a strategic open target, able to be 
translated to the individual level of decision-making and, at the same time, serving 
                                                
2 This is very similar to the German Ordnungspolitik; see also Ahrens (2002). 
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as a goal for development without being fixed to a narrow schedule (Weizsäcker 
et al. 1997; Bleischwitz 2003b). The legally binding character of such target for-
mulation, thus, can evolve over time.  
 
Our co-evolutionary view stresses the importance of knowledge generation in 
different actor groups. Managing more complex structures of public goods and 
externalities, such as biological diversity and different land use functions, requires 
decentralized processes of knowledge creation, bringing forward a variety of tar-
gets within the relevant regions and means to implement them. From a policy per-
spective, topics emerging throughout these decentralized processes can be picked 
up later on when the need for coordination or harmonization arises. That might 
happen, for example, with measurement methodologies and performance indica-
tors. At a later stage in policy cycles policy-makers will already rely on the practi-
cal experience of pioneers and early imitators. Their experience allows setting 
either more ambitious and/or legally binding targets. Co-evolution, thus, is in no 
contradiction to ambitious policies. By emphasizing knowledge generation over 
time, the approach differs from other approaches that define sustainability in 
terms of departing from un-sustainability (Wilkinson/Cary 2002, p. 383). Our 
governance proposition is that, whatever the teething problems, formulating sus-
tainability targets endorses individual and organisational efforts to achieve clarity, 
which is a necessary prerequisite for re-orientation toward sustainability. Regulat-
ed self-regulation can be seen as an on-and-off connection between political and 
corporate activities, where different stages of progress can emerge over time. Pol-
icy integration, as proposed inter alia by the EU’s Cardiff process, takes place on 
multiple arenas, including firms and markets. This co-evolution of corporate and 
political governance, is the basis for the elements of our analytical policy frame-
work discussed below (also see Figure 3). 
5. Governance and Knowledge-Based Firms 
But how does the notion of profit-maximizing firms fit into such a policy frame-
work? This is perhaps the blind spot of governance approaches rooted in the polit-
ical sciences.3 Would profit-maximising firms not try to escape responsibility be-
cause of its inherent costs, and continue to act as free riders benefiting from action 
taken by others? This might well be the case. Corporate behaviour is unlikely ever 
to become benevolent for society as a whole or for the global commons. Why 
should it? But companies can play a public role by overcoming traditional profit-
maximizing behaviour while doing good business in competitive markets. Corpo-
rate actors create new markets for sustainable development that have previously 
been perceived as part of the public domain. The following remarks and the sub-
sequent chapter explain why. 
 
Recent economics (Nelson 2002) reveals a shift in the connotation of ‘profit max-
imisation.’ Previously businesses were quite naturally assumed to be motivated by 
profits and striving toward optimisation along a sharply defined set of opportuni-
ties. Firms were not thought of as groping, experimenting and gradually innovat-
ing toward incremental improvements. The idea much rather was that the pre-
defined set of average total cost, marginal revenues due to market demand, and 
technological choices predetermined profits. Management in this view aimed at an 
optimisation toward market equilibrium. Such companies would obviously have 
no interest in providing for common goods or internalising externalities. 
                                                
3  The outstanding and admirable research of Elinor Ostrom nevertheless shows how corporate 
behaviour tends to be neglected in large parts of governance research. 
Governance of Sustainable Development 8 
 
 
This model, however, could not account for the dynamics of competition and 
knowledge generation. More recent views therefore established an analytical 
model of knowledge-based firms (Leonard-Barton 1995; Langlois/Robertson 
1995; Grant 1996; Nonaka/Toyama 2002). Firms are assumed to act under uncer-
tainties and information deficits. They rely on permanent knowledge generation 
provided by outside sources, experiments, and internal implementation processes. 
Firms can also create markets from scratch, by coordinating with others along 
vertical or horizontal lines. In doing so, firms establish communication with 
stakeholders in order to learn about changing demand, developing useful goods 
and services, and in order to avoid stunning blows of hostile reaction. Figure 1 
illustrates that firms make use of a spiral of knowledge generation helping them to 
transform information generated elsewhere into useful knowledge and, moreover, 
into transaction cost-reducing routine. 
Fig. 1: The spiral of knowledge generation 
The question now is whether such a model overcomes prevailing assumptions 
about corporate approaches to sustainable development and involvement in gov-
ernance structures. What are the implications for the questions outlined here if the 
model is acknowledged to reflect competitive markets? Keys to an answer are a) 
our proposition that there is no fixed borderline between common and private 
goods and b) that there are potential low-cost or even profitable options (‘low-
hanging fruit’). Knowledge-based firms basically do two things toward sustaina-
ble development while serving their own interest: They develop technologies 
and/or services that are private but contribute to public goals. Renewable energies 
and clean water technologies are just a few examples. Firms also work on demand 
creation, be it by marketing or other professional forms of doing business. Exam-
ples are services like leasing, renting, pooling, and sharing goods that contribute 
to the commons, such as the organisation of car-sharing by the industry in order to 
save costs for parking space. Moreover, firms in their internal processes can 
switch to integrated management and value chain management. These efforts help 
combat free riding. Sustainable business models have been developed by Hart 
(1995) and Altman (2001); v. Dijken et al. (1999), Gabel/Sinclair-Desgagné 
(1998), and Porter/v.d. Linde (2000) also deal with such analytical models. Im-
portant to note, these researchers do not yet explore the blurry borderline between 
public and private goods, a proposition whose acknowledgement would give addi-
tional motivation for change. 
 
A point that is relevant in the context of co-evolution is that firms participating 
with stakeholders in the evolution of new market rules can profit from that exer-
cise. This is not only because they can influence the outcome. The main reason, 
once again, is the learning advantage of being a forerunner or fast imitator. Adap-
tation time are significantly shorter for participating firms. Learning during times 
of governmental reframing can trigger competitive advantages. In other cases, any 
further regulation has to rely on experiences gained by pioneering firms because 
they can draw on precise data about the costs and benefits of various institutional 
mechanisms. Governance systems, thus, can rely on exploration and experiments 
undertaken by corporate actors. The free-riding position of simply waiting for 
market rules to come because of the costs of their development is only one choice 
for firms. 
 
Transnational companies (TNC’s) such as chemical giant BASF or the oil compa-
nies BP and Shell illustrate how firms act within our policy framework. Formerly 
devoted to ‘dirty’ business and looking back on a long tradition of environmental 
pollution, such firms have started to learn from failures. Sometimes painful (as in 
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the case of Shell versus Greenpeace over the Brent Spar oil platform in the North 
Sea, or the condemnation of BASF for tardiness in developing CFC substitutes), 
sometimes deliberate (as in the case of BASF development of eco-efficiency 
schemes), sometimes fundamental (as in the change of core competences toward 
renewable energies): These companies now create new markets that relieve envi-
ronmental pressure and act as knowledge-based firms, combining the value-
adding activities of manufacturing and services. They also communicate inten-
sively with stakeholders from various societal groups. Moreover, TNCs may be 
able to assume rule-making authority in societies where the law and the state can 
be considered weak (Cashore 2002; Haufler 2001: p. 120ff.). 
 
It is worth noting that not only TNC’s but also small and medium-sized enterpris-
es (SMEs) can act as knowledge-based firms. Some theories (Langlois/Robertson 
1995) even suggest that SME networks (like Silicon Valley) have more innovative 
thrust than the big companies so advantageous from the Schumpeterian view. 
Such networks among SMEs are quite often associated to local or regional clus-
ters of innovation, involving local municipalities, universities, etc. In a wider 
horizon its relevance for market development and stakeholder concerns mean that 
innovative business increasingly requires understanding local issues beyond the 
regional or national borders. Figure 2 shows a firm as part of a social environ-
ment, interacting with numerous outside stakeholders. 
  Fig. 2: Firms as parts of social environments 
 
Corporate governance is an issue that also fits well into an analysis of how firms 
learn and how they can be managed in a consistent way (Williamson 1999). The 
concept is of increasing importance in the business community. It addresses all 
kinds of management tools able to steer a complex company in uncertain markets 
in co-operation with shareholders and stakeholders on the basis of legal regula-
tions and market-based guidelines. With its emphasis on responsibility, corporate 
governance restricts behaviour seeking for any profit possible and prevents busi-
nesses from undertaking high-risk activities at the expense of society. In addition, 
it supports firms in creating new knowledge helpful for solving future complex 
problems: today’s ideas and institutions shape tomorrow’s markets. 
 
The conclusion for an analytical policy framework is not that the model of the 
knowledge-based firm reflects the only or dominant form of doing business. Many 
firms struggle to survive and hardly spend time with learning and exploring new 
opportunities. Though they may be seen as laggards, they are still relevant for an 
analysis. One also has to keep in mind that firms do not necessarily act with total 
consistency. Some operations may become more sustainable than others where 
asset-specific investments hinder rapid change. But we would like to suggest that 
firms tend to imitate pioneers and successors through benchmarking processes, so 
that incentives for improvements are easier to understand if they also come from 
markets, and not only from governments or the law. These processes of imitation 
lead to a horizontal diffusion of best practices, which is pivotal for sustainable 
development (see Figure 3 below).  
 
Our analytical framework has strong roots in both empirical and theoretical re-
search. The driving force for change is a capitalist knowledge-based firm, and not 
only the ethically inspired entrepreneur or a marketing department determined to 
establish a clean reputation. Knowledge-based firms act as entrepreneurs and pio-
neers, they galvanize other companies and markets. Along that path, a governance 
structure will have to foresee mechanisms that keep an eye on the overall process 
of change, including the firms preferring externalisation. 
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6. Markets for Sustainability 
The thesis outlined above about a public role for corporate actors not only propos-
es ‘better’ firms but also ‘better’ markets. It may come as a surprise that larger 
markets for sustainability are emerging beyond a few pioneering firms. Contrary 
to Lux (2003), the profit motive seems to entail more sustainability potential than 
sceptics perceive. The proof, thus, is related to the evolution of markets. They 
evolve over time and with institutional and behavioural change effected through 
appropriate governance structures. Rigid frameworks, however, are not conducive 
to change, which requires flexible structures. 
 
Technological change has a definite bearing on market evolution (Freeman 1998; 
Langlois/Robertson 1995). Discoveries can set the course for cleaner production, 
more efficient manufacturing processes, new products able to lower environmen-
tal pressure, etc. One may underline that technological change can shift the bor-
derline from public goods toward private goods insofar as goods formerly per-
ceived as public can be provided by private action. A clean environment, seen 
from this angle, can at least partly be provided through private market activities. 
Firms hold an interest in these emerging markets as long as profit can be ex-
pected. Sequences of incremental technological change can stimulate markets at 
least as well as radical innovations can–incremental changes are more open to 
flexible incentives provided by other firms, stakeholders, and regulatory efforts. 
 
Transaction costs associated with research and development as well as with the 
ensuing establishment of new markets of course have to be taken into account. 
Markets for public goods involve a multitude of actors. Of some public goods, 
consumers have only a vague notion so their demand needs to be awakened 
(Loasby 2001). Firms, markets, and institutions can economize these transaction 
costs. Seen within the analytical framework outlined here, the process is one 
where originally public activities gradually move toward the involvement of prof-
itable markets. The essential prerequisite are co-evolving incentives set through 
governance systems, a point that deserves more thorough research.4 Agencies and 
standardized business reports offer ways of lowering transaction costs. In terms of 
market evolution, the following steps can be expected to lower transaction costs: 
 
• overcoming information deficits, 
• overhauling sustainability management within firms, 
• establishing supply chain management among firms (vertical co-
operation), 
• opening the supply chain for stakeholder involvement, 
• initiating sequences of incremental innovations or more radical innova-
tions like functional redesign or system renewal, 
• promoting horizontal diffusion of innovations. 
 
Emerging markets for sustainability are especially obvious in some areas. Of 
course eco-efficiency is about new markets for clean technologies and services. 
The same holds true for energy efficiency and clean energy supply. But how does 
                                                
4  See from our list of references Bleischwitz (2003a + b); Cashore (2002); v. Dijken et al. 
(1999); Gabel/Sinclair-Desgagné (1998); Haufler (2001); Héritier (2002); Weizsäcker et al. 
(1997).  
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this apply with other environmental problems such as climate protection? Is the 
climate not a truly global public good? This paper does not seek to argue against 
open access to and non-rivalry in consumption of Earth’s atmosphere. But the 
proposed thesis about markets for sustainability may open a new perspective on 
the problem of non-excludability. Climate protection comes with energy efficien-
cy, with increasing shares of renewable energies, and with growing markets for 
eco-efficiency as a substitute for resource-intensive manufacturing processes. 
These markets can be made profitable; marginal cost functions can be modelled as 
step-shaped functions. Emerging stepwise along a learning governance structure, 
sustainability markets also produce positive externalities insofar as they have 
positive impacts on Earth’s atmosphere. Seen from this angle, governance for 
sustainable development becomes a positive-sum game: once markets for energy 
efficiency, renewable energies, and eco-efficiency start to emerge, they can pro-
vide public goods or, more precisely, reduce risks and contribute to stabilizing 
Earth’s atmosphere. Working toward the realization of such a scenario requires 
strengthening processes of search, discovery, innovation, and diffusion. This is a 
definite challenge for firms, stakeholders, and governments. Figure 2 (above) il-
lustrates the double meaning of environment: firms act as parts of natural and so-
cial environments alike. Markets for sustainability emerge as a means for solving 
coordination problems among different actors where goods need to be provided. 
7. Innovation-Inducing and Responsive Regulation 
As outlined above, any governance of sustainability will have to deal with mani-
fold forms of doing business as well as with the day-to-day policies of a wide va-
riety of actors. Of course there is room for command-and-control approaches and 
other policies that restrict businesses in case of permanent non-compliance or 
high-risk activities. But governance structures also become important when long-
term tasks like climate protection are to be performed, which requires learning 
and change. For such tasks, the notion of innovation-inducing regulation (Jä-
nicke/Jacob 2002) fits into our framework. This type of regulation is not only 
conducive to innovation but also co-evolves along with the specific developments 
in each case. Such co-evolution between corporate and political actors is based on 
the insight that important governance functions have to be dealt with at the level 
of day-to-day governance and cannot completely be regulated ex-ante by any po-
litical or constitutional order. This is because of uncertainties, knowledge deficits 
and, by and large, the creativity of the human mind in performing actions with 
unpredictable results. One may note that these uncertainties derive from different 
sources: the exploration of the previously unknown as well as the persistence of 
market failures that prove more difficult to overcome than expected. Innovation-
inducing regulation, hence, co-evolves with corporate activities and the emer-
gence of new markets for sustainability. In contrast to Jänicke and Jacob (2002), 
who put great emphasis on political actors, we would argue the strength of co-
evolution as a process.  This statement on co-evolution is stronger than the analy-
sis of Jänicke and Jacob (2002) reveals, who put more emphasis on political ac-
tors. 
 
Innovation-inducing regulation has a short time horizon of a few months or years, 
whereas framing efforts have an impact over many years if not decades. Innova-
tion-inducing regulation relates to the governmental function of absorbing societal 
problems, bringing together heterogeneous actors, arriving at solutions for specif-
ic problems. At the same time, this type of regulation takes into account that gov-
ernments do not necessarily have the knowledge what exactly can be done. They 
draw business attention to certain problems rather than telling them what to do. 
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Governments help to establish win-win coalitions, but they do not specify which 
action should be taken. They participate in networks and other forms of multi-
actor coalitions without being in a dominant position. Policy-making shifts from 
policy-makers to a multitude of actors including corporate actors and environmen-
tal and/or social NGOs. Corporate governance and our notion of knowledge-based 
firms fit well into a comprehensive governance system. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates this view. It basically shows that policies and management 
develop through different stages, moving from immediate problem-solving to in-
stitutionalisation to low-cost, innovative, and preventive approaches. The point for 
governance is twofold: Firstly, each stage serves a certain function, and any insti-
tutional leapfrogging strategy may come at the expense of comprehensiveness and 
major actors. Secondly, any progress depends on co-evolution, not only on suc-
cess in policy or management. There is hardly a country in the world where eco-
efficient services (stage 4 in environmental management in the figure below) 
emerge without incentives being set by governments nor, vice versa, where hori-
zontal coordination among ministries and institutional adaptation flexibility (stag-
es 3 and 4 in environmental policy) improve without support from vested or new-
ly-established interest groups.  
Fig. 3: Co-Evolution of Corporate and Political Governance 
 
The figure suggests that participatory and administrative processes in both gov-
ernments and businesses increasingly fulfil important governance functions previ-
ously devoted to a political framework. Stabilization, for instance, not only results 
from a framework but also from adaptation to new conditions. The importance of 
adaptive flexibility increases with the degree of uncertainty and change. For gov-
ernance aiming at long-term change with varied innovation, adaptive flexibility is 
therefore at least as relevant as an ex-ante framework. This is also why empirical 
research on actor behaviour is so important. 
 
Responsive regulation as defined by Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and Nonet and 
Salznick (1978) is a helpful concept for describing processes between actors 
where participation creates regulatory knowledge at different levels. It refers to 
the leeway that corporate actors need in order to innovate, and which governments 
should guarantee. In addition, it emphasizes the need to strengthen third parties 
such as environmental NGOs in their capacity to monitor progress and articulate 
concerns. The concept of governance for sustainable development can draw on 
these recent theories on innovation induced by soft regulation and achieved in 
multi-actor coalitions. 
 
What does that mean for a comprehensive governance strategy? The purpose of 
innovation-inducing and responsible regulation is to enable action at the micro-
level of markets and society by accepting diversity in actor behaviour and by giv-
ing appropriately flexible incentives. This implies a kind of regulation not deter-
mined by a rigid frame, and precludes strict regulation that would stifle the adap-
tive flexibility of markets and societies. The following criteria are geared to as-
sessing to what extent regulatory policies stimulate learning processes among ac-
tor groups: 
 
1) Does the regulation reflect the total cost of an activity and does it facilitate 
price mechanisms (i.e. the ability of prices to change according to supply 
and demand)? 
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2) Does the regulation state its targets clearly and thus provide orientation for 
actors in the market and society, enabling them to adopt similar targets and 
related measures? 
3) Does the regulation allow for adaptive flexibility and freedom to choose 
among different alternatives? 
4) What kind of incentives for knowledge creation are given? 
5) Are there inconsistencies in the regulation or in relation to other institu-
tions that permit bypassing the rules? 
6) Are there incentives for third actors to become partners in implementing 
and improving the regulation? 
 
Case studies on how such criteria and the resulting policy framework can be ap-
plied have been published on Japanese sustainability approaches and on German 
waste policy (Bleischwitz 2003 a + b). An ongoing study (see acknowledgements) 
will discuss further case studies that cover local and regional approaches as well 
as international areas. The upcoming EU strategies on Integrated Product Policy 
and on Sustainable Use of Natural Resources also rely on corporate strategies and 
may provide excellent points of departure for further case studies. 
8. Conclusions 
Governance as described in the present paper reveals its greatest strengths where 
long-term innovatory tasks with low immediate damage potential are pursued. 
Such processes usually result in new actor coalitions and the formulation of new 
rules of the game. Areas of application are climate change policies (beyond the 
need for managing specific impacts), eco-efficiency policies, water policies, 
provision of public goods, etc. Where governance approaches might fall short is in 
dealing with immediate concerns and specifically vulnerable groups in societies 
worldwide. But nevertheless it is likely that multi-actor and multi-layered 
governance systems will become more important within the next years. 
 
In distinction to many other approaches, our policy framework welcomes the self-
interest of business as a beneficent force. Business self-interest is not content with 
the exploitation of ‘low-hanging fruits’ but promotes the creation of new 
knowledge as businesses recognize changing market expectations and the 
resulting needs for market evolution. A cloud on this horizon is, however, that if 
profits fall short of expectation, business can always opt out of governance 
processes. The function of governance, thus, is to support processes of mutual 
learning, with governments in a strong but not dominant position. This function 
goes well beyond the usual compliance procedures.  
 
Innovation-inducing regulation levels the playing field for corporate actors in their 
daily operations, leaving it up to society and markets to determine which solutions 
are discovered and how they are implemented. The provision of common goods 
and the internalisation of externalities, usually thought of as core competences of 
states, can gradually shift to co-evolutionary processes managed by corporate, 
societal, and governmental action. Though existing programmes of privatisation 
do have some shortcomings, the general indication is that actors learn from 
mistakes, and that further involvement of corporate and other societal actors is 
likely to improve governance processes. Monitoring remains a public task, as does 
the provision and maintenance of a legal order that is able to deal with free riders 
and serious non-compliance. 
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In analytical terms, our policy framework for corporate action combines elements 
of new institutional economics, evolutionary economics, and actor-centred 
institutionalism. Though each of these branches has been criticised for being 
heterogeneous and much in line with traditional approaches shown to be 
'unsustainable,' the overall framework seems consistent and well suited for 
application in case studies.  
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Fig. 1: The spiral of knowledge generation 
 
Source: Nonaka/Toyama 2002. 
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Fig. 2: Firms as parts of social environments 
 
Source: Nonaka/Toyama 2002. 
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Fig. 3: Co-Evolution of Corporate and Political Governance 
 Source: Bleischwitz 2003a. 
